Abstract: In Davis v. United States, the United States Supreme Court established a high standard to invoke the Miranda right to counsel, holding that a suspect must make a clear and unequivocal request for an attorney. Two years later, Congress passed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), which created a highly deferential standard of review for state court judgments challenged under federal habeas corpus jurisdiction. Generally, a state prisoner challenging the alleged deprivation of his Miranda right to counsel may obtain federal court relief under AEDPA only if his conviction in state court was based on an "objectively unreasonable" application of U.S. Supreme Court precedent. This Comment argues that the AEDPA standard of review effectively raises the bar for individuals to successfully invoke their right to counsel above what Davis requires, even outside the habeas context. This means that AEDPA's procedural standard of review has effected a shift in substantive law, even if courts did not intend that shift. To remedy this skewing of substantive law, this Comment proposes that the Court should discourage trial and directreview courts from basing their decisions on AEDPA cases.
INTRODUCTION
"I think I would like to talk to a lawyer." 1 19 This entirely novel standard of review means that when a court decides a case under AEDPA, it is not saying what the law is; rather it is saying what the limit of the law is. That is, it is saying what constitutes a patent transgression of the law, and not how the law itself should be applied.
The distinction is crucial. As federal habeas courts have interpreted state Miranda rulings 20 through AEDPA's highly deferential prism, they have left undisturbed lower-court decisions holding phrases to be inadequate to invoke-phrases the habeas court might otherwise call a valid invocation. This process creates a body of invocation pseudoprecedent. That is, precedent that does not precisely state whether a phrase invokes the right to counsel, but instead explains that it was not an outright transgression of the law to hold that it did not invoke. That pseudo-precedent is then cited by state and federal courts reviewing purported invocations de novo, which are sometimes themselves cycled through the AEDPA filter. The final outcome of the interplay between Davis and AEDPA has been a shift in substantive law: a whittling away of the acceptable phrases for invoking the right to counsel to only the most obvious. 21 That is, a suspect is effectively required to say nothing other than the magic words, "I want a lawyer."
This Comment analyzes what I will call AEDPA's "ratchet effect" on the standard for invoking the Miranda right to counsel. Part I examines the Court's approach to the right to counsel before 1994. Part II discusses the Court's decision in Davis v. United States, and Part III explains the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, its history, and its deferential standard of review. Part IV discusses in detail the effect AEDPA has had on invocation jurisprudence, and examines two , in which the phrase, "I think I need a lawyer," has been cited in at least twenty-eight cases to reject similar claimed invocations).
illustrative cases with a quantitative analysis of their effects. Finally, Part V proposes that the Court should discourage lower courts from basing their decisions on AEDPA precedent except when they apply AEDPA themselves.
I.
IN MIRANDA V. ARIZONA, THE U.S. SUPREME COURT PLACED SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL WITHOUT STATING HOW IT IS INVOKED Access to legal representation is a key value of American criminal law. The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution specifically requires that all criminal defendants have access to an attorney during trial. 22 This was in part a reaction to English law of the mid-to-late 1700s, which barred assistance of counsel in most criminal cases. 23 Today, of course, the assistance of counsel is considered a fundamental part of any criminal proceeding in any American court. For its part, the U.S. Supreme Court has protected the Sixth Amendment right to counsel with a steadiness that is rare in constitutional criminal procedure. 24 Beginning in the 1930s, the Court began expanding the right to counsel by setting standards for counsel's performance 25 and strengthening waiver requirements. 26 The Court has since reached beyond the Sixth Amendment to hold that, as a Fifth Amendment matter, a criminal defendant is entitled to the assistance of counsel in an adversarial setting even outside the courtroom, namely police interrogations. In Miranda v. Arizona, 27 the Court applied to interrogations the Sixth Amendment notion that a 25. See Powell, 287 U.S. at 57 (holding that the right to counsel is the right to effective counsel in certain capital cases).
26. See Johnson, 304 U.S. at 463-65 (imposing a knowing-and-intelligent-waiver requirement).
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
layperson would need an attorney to navigate a complicated and imposing legal system, 28 requiring that accused persons be afforded access to counsel, if requested. 29 It would be nearly thirty years, however, before the Court stated how a suspect should invoke the right to counsel that it articulated in Miranda.
30

A. Miranda v. Arizona Established a Post-Arrest Right to Counsel for Criminal Suspects
The ruling of Miranda v. Arizona is quite familiar. 31 Barring certain key exceptions, 32 a criminal suspect in police custody must be informed of his or her right to remain silent and to consult an attorney. 33 The Court designed the Miranda holdings to protect a criminal suspect's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, the concern being that a suspect in police custody may feel coerced into incriminating himself. 34 Because of that concern, once a suspect invokes one of the Miranda rights, police questioning must cease.
35 After a suspect invokes his right to counsel, questioning may resume only when the suspect has a lawyer present, 36 when fourteen days pass after release from custody, 37 or when the suspect himself reinitiates communication. 38 Otherwise, the police may not ask the suspect any more questions, and any of the suspect's statements taken in contravention of the rule are inadmissible in court. 
B. The Court Placed Greater Protections on the Right to Counsel than on the Right to Silence
Miranda articulated two rights of criminal suspects subjected to police interrogation: the right to silence and the right to counsel. 50 These rights do not accrue automatically, however. Rather, a suspect must invoke his rights to silence and counsel by communicating his desire to invoke them to his interrogators. 51 How a suspect invokes those rights is rarely clear, and it varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Despite their common origin, the Court has treated the Miranda rights to silence and to counsel differently, arguably offering more protection to the right to counsel.
In invocation jurisprudence, there are two central questions: what constitutes an invocation, and how must police behave once a right is invoked?
52 Miranda held that an individual effectively invokes his right to remain silent when he "indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent," at which point "the interrogation must cease."
53 After this, however, the Court did not clarify the meaning of the phrase "indicates in any manner" for close to thirty years. 54 In the meantime, the Court elaborated on "the interrogation must cease" in Michigan v. Mosley, 55 holding that police must "scrupulously honor[]" a suspect's rights after he has indicated a desire to remain silent. 56 The Court identified six factors to determine whether the police had scrupulously honored the suspect's rights: (1) how quickly police ceased questioning after the suspect invoked his right to silence; (2) the amount of time that elapsed before questioning resumed; (3) whether the suspect was advised of his Miranda rights again before questioning resumed; (4) whether the same or different officers conducted the second interrogation; (5) whether the topic of the second interrogation was the same as the first; and (6) In Edwards v. Arizona, 63 however, the Court directly answered the second question: how must police behave after a suspect invokes his right to counsel? 64 The Court articulated a bright-line rule barring further questioning after an invocation, until counsel is provided or the suspect reinitiates communication. 65 In Edwards, a suspect in police custody indicated that he wanted to "make a deal," but only with an attorney present, at which point the interrogation stopped. 66 The next morning, however, the police resumed interrogation without providing a lawyer, and the suspect implicated himself in the crime, leading to his conviction. 67 The facts in Edwards were similar to those in Mosley. As in Mosley, the officer initially cut off questioning immediately after Edwards invoked his Miranda rights (this time to counsel), there was a significant lapse of time before the second interrogation, the officers in the second 58 interrogation were different from the original questioning officer, and they warned him of his Miranda rights before beginning the second interrogation. 68 Additionally, the second group of officers directly refused to honor Edwards' request to remain silent. 69 Yet, the Court did not apply Mosley's flexible "scrupulously honored" rule. Rather, when Edwards challenged the use of his statements at trial, the Court held that "an accused, . . . having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him." 70 The Edwards holding created a "rigid prophylactic rule," 71 barring all further questioning after a suspect invokes the Miranda right to counsel until an attorney is present.
72 Edwards had no effect on the right to silence, however, which is still governed by Mosley's more flexible "scrupulously honored" analysis, in which the passage of time and other factors mitigate the effect of an invocation of the right to silence.
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Having established a "rigid prophylactic rule," the Edwards Court went on to strengthen it by answering a third question: what constitutes a waiver? The Court held that merely responding to police questioning after invoking the right to counsel does not establish a waiver, even if police re-advise the suspect of his rights. 74 Neither did Edwards answer the question of how police should proceed when faced with a statement that might be an invocation.
In response, state and federal courts developed three main approaches to address unclear invocations in the thirteen years before the U.S. Supreme Court stepped in. 78 The first and broadest approach, embraced primarily by the Sixth Circuit, held that any statement that could be construed as a request for counsel validly invokes the right such that the interrogation must cease. 79 Other courts developed a narrow approach in which only very clear requests for counsel would require police officers to immediately cease questioning under Edwards, and the police were free to ignore any ambiguous requests. 80 Most federal courts, however, took a middle approach (or clarification approach) in which officers faced with an ambiguous request must ask only questions intended to clarify whether or not the suspect actually desired counsel. 81 Many state courts favored this approach as well.
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While lower courts developed these three approaches, the U.S. Supreme Court remained deferential to suspects in other areas of Miranda law. In Smith v. Illinois, 83 for example, the Court held that police could not use a suspect's responses to questioning after invoking the right to counsel "to cast doubt on the adequacy of the initial request itself," saying such a practice is "intolerable." 84 The Court continued to strengthen Edwards' bright-line rule throughout the 1980s and into the early 1990s. In Arizona v. Roberson, 85 the Court held that a right-tocounsel invocation applies to all police questioning, not just to questions about a particular offense. 86 In Davis v. United States, Davis, a member of the United States Navy, was arrested in connection with the murder of a fellow sailor. 92 Upon learning of his involvement, Naval Investigative Service agents advised Davis that he was a suspect in the killing, gave him warnings consistent with both Miranda and the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and proceeded to interview him. 93 Davis waived his rights to silence and to counsel, both orally and in writing. 94 About ninety minutes into the interview, Davis stated, "Maybe I should talk to a lawyer." 95 At that point, the agents re-advised Davis of his rights and told him the interview would stop if he did indeed want a lawyer. 96 Davis responded, "No, I'm not asking for a lawyer . . . I don't want a lawyer," and the interview continued. 97 After another hour of interrogation, Davis said "I think I want a lawyer before I say anything else," at which point the interview ceased. 98 At his general court martial, the Military Judge denied Davis' motion to suppress the statements he had made after he said, "Maybe I should talk to a lawyer." (1966)) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted) (noting that a concern about linguistic capacities of suspects "thrust" into interrogation "has, in the past, dissuaded the Court from placing any burden of clarity upon individuals in custody, but has led it instead to require that requests for counsel be given a broad, rather than a narrow, interpretation"). That is, it is impossible for there to be a truly objective inquiry into a request because that inquiry is designed to discover the speaker's subjective intent, and "every interpreter implicitly provides a context and a hypothetical speaker's intent." Id. at 756-58. Moreover, it is absurd, they argue, to require objective clarity of language when a speaker's intent is plain. 106. Id. The Court limited the applicability of its new "clear and unequivocal request" rule, as it has come to be called, to invocations made after the suspect had waived his Miranda rights. The Court made this explicit in its holding: "We therefore hold that, after a knowing and voluntary waiver of the Miranda rights, law enforcement officers may continue questioning until and unless the suspect clearly requests an attorney." Id. at 461. The Court's rationale also reflected this logic. It reasoned that a suspect who had waived his rights "has indicated his willingness to deal with the police unassisted." Id. at 460-61. If the suspect later wants a lawyer present, the Court stated, it is his burden to "affirmatively invoke[]" that right. Id. at 461.
Id. at 454 (majority opinion
suspects "because of fear, intimidation, lack of linguistic skills, or a variety of other reasons."
107 However, the Court explained, the Miranda warnings themselves are the primary protection, and "full comprehension of the rights" suffices to counterbalance the coercive effect of police interrogation. 108 Thus, the Court held that it is the warnings themselves-rather than facile invocation of the rights-that constitute the substance of Miranda's protection. 109 Having answered the first question left open in Edwards, the Court went on to answer the second: what must police do after an unclear invocation? Justice O'Connor observed that a rule requiring police to stop questioning whenever a suspect utters a statement that "might be a request for an attorney" would soften the Edwards bright-line rule requiring police to immediately cease questioning.
110 It would, she wrote, cloud its "clarity and ease of application" and undermine effective law enforcement by introducing uncertainty into interrogations.
111 As such, the Court held that "after a knowing and voluntary waiver of the Miranda rights, law enforcement officers may 107. Id. at 460. In his concurrence, Justice Souter took particular umbrage at this likelihood, using it to argue for a clarification rule. See id. at 469-70 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment) ("A substantial percentage of [suspects] lack anything like a confident command of the English language, many are 'woefully ignorant,' and many more will be sufficiently intimidated by the interrogation process or overwhelmed by the uncertainty of their predicament that the ability to speak assertively will abandon them.") (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468) (citations omitted ("The Edwards rule-questioning must cease if the suspect asks for a lawyer-provides a bright line that can be applied by officers in the real world of investigation and interrogation without unduly hampering the gathering of information. But if we were to require questioning to cease if a suspect makes a statement that might be a request for an attorney, this clarity and ease of application would be lost. Police officers would be forced to make difficult judgment calls about whether the suspect in fact wants a lawyer even though he has not said so, with the threat of suppression if they guess wrong.") (emphasis in original). Some have pointed out that this is backwards logic. E.g., Strauss, supra note 15, at 1028-29. It introduces far more uncertainty to require a clarity analysis, rather than simply imposing an across-the-board cutoff at all requests for counsel, however ambiguous. The writ of habeas corpus allows a person subject to confinement to petition a court for a determination that the confinement is unjust. , for example, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island considered whether the question "Can I get a lawyer?" was a clear and unambiguous request for counsel under Davis. In its analysis, the court noted that, depending on context, sometimes questions are understood as requests ("Can I get some service over here?" said to a sales clerk) and sometimes as simple questions ("Can I get a slice of pepperoni pizza?" said in a pizza parlor not clearly selling pizza by the slice, or, for that matter, pepperoni pizza). Id. at 425 n.5. The court remanded the case so that the trial court could consider the context of the question, including responses from the interrogating officers. federal court. 129 The federal government arrogated to itself the power to grant the writ to state prisoners in its post-Civil War backlash against state power.
130 Congress lodged that power in the federal courts with the passage of the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867. 131 The modern history of habeas corpus law, however, begins with Brown v. Allen, 132 which established that federal habeas corpus review of state court convictions was de novo for pure and mixed questions of federal constitutional law.
133
The next watershed moment in the evolution of the habeas standard of review came in 1989. In Teague v. Lane, 134 the Court held that federal courts could not entertain habeas claims that ask the court to expand federal constitutional rights. 135 The result was that federal habeas corpus cases could not contribute to the development of criminal law, except in the rarest of cases. 136 In one sense, Teague can be seen as a precursor to AEDPA insofar as it required that habeas courts not announce constitutional rules "not dictated by precedent."
137 This admonition was later clarified to mean that not even a modest extension of existing precedent was allowed, but, unlike AEDPA, there was no restriction to U.S. Supreme Court precedent. 138 AEDPA's habeas section-part of a much larger bill-includes what became 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1) , which provides that a federal court sitting in habeas jurisdiction may not overturn a state decision merely because that decision is incorrect. 142 Rather, AEDPA requires that a federal habeas court ask whether the state court's opinion is "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of," U.S. Supreme Court precedent. 143 Where there is no U.S. Supreme Court decision on point, there can be no precedent to unreasonably apply, and the conviction must stand. 144 Congressional proponents intended this highly deferential standard of review to expedite justice and minimize federal involvement in settled state court convictions.
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Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole introduced the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act on April 27, 1995, eight days after the Oklahoma City bombing and roughly two weeks after he announced he would seek the presidency. 146 Referring to the bombing, Senator Dole told Congress that the bill would ensure "that those who committed this evil deed will get what they deserve-punishment that is swift, certain, and severe." 147 Notably, then-Senator Joe Biden was vocally opposed to the bill, including its novel standard of review, which he called "a heck of a standard to have to apply." 141 CONG. REC. S7841 (daily ed. June 7, 1995) (statement of Sen. Biden). Senator Biden, who had lost his chairmanship of the Senate Judiciary Committee a few months prior, was especially concerned about the elimination of the right to counsel in habeas proceedings and the fact that the bill would "make[] sweeping changes in the rules of the game." Id. at S7812-13. Others were concerned that the "deference provision" would effectively "repeal the habeas corpus statute." Id. at S7839 (statement of Sen. Cohen) (quoting Professor Henry Monaghan). Perhaps hoping Dole's bill would suffer the same fate as Specter's, Senator Biden first proposed amending the bill to remove the "95 percent of [it]" that was "not germane" to habeas corpus reform, leaving only those provisions dealing with federal prisoners. Id. at S7806. Biden later went so far as to introduce an amendment to eliminate the "deference rule." Id. at S7840. He was joined in his opposition by Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, who stated outright, "This legislation will eviscerate the writ of habeas corpus . . . ." Id. at S7878-9 (statement of Sen. Moynihan). Ultimately, Senator Biden voted for the bill, while Moynihan did not. The Court has made several other attempts to clarify how courts should apply § 2254. 158 In Williams v. Taylor, 159 for example, the Court interpreted the phrases "contrary to" and "unreasonable application of" found in the statute. 160 The Court suggested that AEDPA created an entirely novel standard of review. 161 Justice Stevens explained that the statutory text does not identify a familiar standard of review such as "de novo" or "plain error."
162 "Rather, the text is fairly read simply as a command that a federal court not issue the habeas writ unless the state the profound effect that its proponents and detractors expected). 
IV. AEDPA'S STANDARD OF REVIEW CREATES A ONE-WAY RATCHET AGAINST SUSPECTS' MIRANDA RIGHTS
The AEDPA standard of review directs federal courts to state whether another court's application of the Davis "clear and unequivocal request" rule was reasonable, rather than apply the Davis rule itself. This creates a kind of pseudo-precedent that does not really state the law, but instead states what is not an "unreasonable application of the law," a distinction unsuitability determination . . . were wholly unsupported by 'some evidence,' . . . we are unable to conclude that the Board's findings regarding the nature of the commitment offense were without some evidentiary support.") 173. Id. at 854-59 (Noonan, J., concurring); id. at 859 (Reinhardt, J., concurring specially); id. at 859-60 (Fernandez, J., concurring).
174.
Id. at 854 (Noonan, J., concurring); id. at 859 (Reinhardt, J., concurring specially). . 2000) , which required that courts first decide whether or not the decision under review was in error, and then proceed to the question of whether the decision was "reasonable." In so holding, it alluded to problems of obscuring constitutional jurisprudence and its role in providing guidance to state courts. Id. ("Requiring federal courts to first determine whether the state court's decision was erroneous, prior to considering whether it was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of controlling law under AEDPA, promotes clarity in our own constitutional jurisprudence and also provides guidance for state courts, which can look to our decisions for their persuasive value.").
Id.
trial and direct-review courts often fail to note. That pseudo-precedent, extremely deferential to state courts, will almost always favor the prosecution, holding state-court rejections of right to counsel invocations were "reasonable." As illustrated by a quantitative analysis of two cases below, other courts not applying AEDPA then rely on that pseudoprecedent over and over again to reject purported invocations. Ultimately, what was originally a statement of what was not an unreasonable application of Davis becomes a substantive definition of a clear and unequivocal request. These phenomena, working in tandem, create a one-way ratchet, narrowing the phrases that can invoke the right to counsel.
A. AEDPA Has Led Federal Courts to Narrow the Davis Rule for Invoking the Miranda Right to Counsel
Under AEPDA, as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court, federal courts reviewing state court convictions do not directly apply the relevant law. 179 Rather, AEDPA directs them to ascertain what the law is, as determined by the Court, and then decide whether the state court's interpretation falls within the reasonable limits of the law's application. 180 Therefore, in the right-to-counsel context, federal courts applying AEDPA to state prisoners' habeas petitions must ask whether an invocation could possibly be construed as ambiguous or equivocal. Framing the question this way begs an affirmative answer.
It is important to understand the magnitude of deference that AEDPA requires, as compared to a de novo standard, and it bears repeating here. Courts applying AEDPA are powerless to identify rights and limitations on their own and to use glosses on the law established by lower courts. Under an ordinary de novo standard of review, a federal court could ask, "What is the law as this circuit sees it, and how should it apply here?" Under AEDPA's "unreasonable application" standard, the court may only ask, "Is this interpretation of law an absolutely impermissible interpretation of Supreme Court precedent?"
181 If the state court decision at issue is not absolutely impermissible, the court applying AEDPA must affirm. 182 This subtlety is often lost on courts not applying AEDPA. For that reason, the difference between the de novo standard (defining the law) and the AEDPA standard (defining the limits of the law) sets the stage for shift in substantive law.
The AEDPA standard poses a significant risk of narrowing the Miranda right to counsel in its interplay with Davis v. United States.
184
AEDPA creates a one-way ratchet effect, narrowing the set of phrases considered effective to invoke a suspect's right to counsel to only the most obvious. This occurs as follows: first, a federal court is presented with a case in which a constitutionally questionable (but not "objectively unreasonable") invocation decision resulted in a conviction, and affirms it under the § 2254(d)(1) standard of review, although it might not have under a de novo standard. Then, when that case is published, it becomes precedent that is cited by lower courts to reach similar conclusions on the merits of invocation cases.
To illustrate these two steps, we can look to an individual phrase. In the first step, a state court rejects a given phrase as a right-to-counsel invocation, and a federal habeas court gives deference to that rejection. A criminal suspect taken into custody makes a reference to counsel during or prior to his interrogation (for example, "Could I get a lawyer?"). Police, hoping to get a confession, do not interpret the reference as a request and continue questioning. When the interrogation continues, the suspect makes incriminating statements. Those statements are admitted at trial, with the state court determining that the suspect's reference to counsel was not "clear and unequivocal" under Davis, 185 and the defendant is convicted. After exhausting state court remedies, 186 the convict petitions in federal court for a writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to AEDPA. The federal court, despite its reluctance to support the state court's interpretation of Davis, is constrained by § 2254. The federal habeas court is bound to deny the petition if it determines that the state court's application of Davis was not objectively unreasonable.
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The second step effectuates the substantive change in law, and turns other AEDPA cases affirming something at the outside edges of "reasonableness," there is a strong risk that the edge could be pushed even further. the ratchet. Here, the federal court's Davis holding becomes precedentor, more precisely, pseudo-precedent-that state courts cite without reference to the standard of review. When a new and perhaps clearer phrase (such as, "Can I get my lawyer?") enters the cycle at the state court level, prosecutors seeking a conviction find and point to the earlier AEDPA case that deemed insufficient the phrase, "Could I get a lawyer?" The state court, without parsing the standard of review, looks to that earlier AEDPA decision as persuasive authority to deny the new defendant's motion to suppress his incriminating statements, and the defendant is convicted. The new phrase ("Can I get my lawyer?") then enters federal court in an AEDPA habeas petition, becoming its own pseudo-precedent, and the process begins anew.
AEDPA's ratchet effect only goes one way. A federal court applying AEDPA is deciding not what the law is, but what the limits are for a reasonable application of the law. When it decides those limits in the context of right-to-counsel invocations, it will always be considering phrases that were not clear enough to halt the interrogation in the first place.
188 Because only convicts can seek habeas corpus review, federal courts applying AEDPA will never be asked, "Was this statement, interpreted as clear below, actually ambiguous?" Therefore, those courts will always be in a position to apply deference to the police, rather than the defendant. This effect pushes invocation jurisprudence to the outer limit of what constitutes a "reasonable" interpretation of Davis. Once that limit is reached, the law will not stray far from it. As soon as one court, whether applying AEDPA or not, interprets the law in a certain way, it is more likely that a subsequent court will view that interpretation as a reasonable one taken by "fairminded jurists."
189
Through the two-step process described above, a federal court creates AEDPA pseudo-precedent deeming a phrase inadequate to invoke the right to counsel, even if it might have interpreted it on de novo review as a clear and unequivocal request. The net result is a more restrictive standard for valid invocations than was perhaps originally intended.
188. See Strauss, supra note 15, at 1034 (noting that clear and unambiguous invocations of the right to counsel might never make it into published opinions).
189. See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011) (holding that a federal habeas writ may only be granted if "there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree"). This is despite the Court's earlier warning that a decision is not reasonable merely because "at least one of the Nation's jurists has applied the relevant federal law in the same manner the state court did." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 409-10 (2000).
B. AEDPA Cases Set a High Clarity Burden that is Then Cited in Non-AEDPA Decisions
The narrowing process begins when a federal habeas court applies to a given phrase a standard of clarity that goes beyond what that court might have decided on de novo review. One can most easily observe AEDPA's effect with reference to individual cases. 190 The following two cases illustrate this phenomenon by a quantitative measurement of their effects. 191 
Twenty-Eight Cases Have Cited the Phrase "I Think I Need a Lawyer" to Reject Purported Invocations
On the night of January 13, 1993, Russel Burket brutally murdered Katherine and Ashley Tafelski in their Virginia home. 192 Seven days later, when police questioned him as a suspect, Burket made two statements about counsel, roughly twelve minutes apart.
193 After the first statement, "I'm gonna need a lawyer," the police detectives advised Burket that he was not under arrest and was free to go, after which the interview resumed and Burket admitted to killing the victims. 194 He then said, "I think I need a lawyer," at which point the detectives frisked him, Mirandized him, and placed him in custody. 195 The trial court denied Burket's motion to suppress his videotaped confession. 196 Burket pled guilty to the murders, as well as three other crimes associated with them, "reserving the right to challenge on appeal the admissibility of his confession." 197 The court sentenced Burket to death. 191. I chose these two examples not because they definitively show that a phrase that would pass muster on de novo review fails on AEDPA review. That is almost impossible to demonstrate as courts issuing published opinions are loath to undermine their own decisions by stating that they disagree with the outcome. Rather, the examples used demonstrate how a phrase that might reasonably be interpreted as a valid invocation under Davis could be affected by AEDPA. 
Id.
Although Burket raised numerous issues in his subsequent federal habeas petition, the only one relevant to this analysis was Burket's assertion that police violated his Miranda right to counsel. 199 The Fourth Circuit panel, reviewing the case under AEDPA, determined that it was not unreasonable for the Virginia Supreme Court to conclude that Burket's first statement, "I'm gonna need a lawyer," had not effectively invoked Burket's right to counsel because it was made prior to arrest.
200
The Fourth Circuit then held that his second statement, "I think I need a lawyer," was inadequate as a request for counsel. 201 The court dismissed Burket's appeal. 202 To date, Burket has been cited in some 386 state and federal cases.
203
Of those, thirty-two were non-AEDPA cases citing Burket on the rightto-counsel issue. In twenty-eight of those cases, Burket's phrase, "I think I need a lawyer," was cited analogically to demonstrate that another similar phrase was insufficient to invoke the right to counsel. 204 None of the twenty-eight cases discussed Burket's AEDPA standard of review, 205 and none expressly acknowledged that the Fourth Circuit might have decided otherwise had it been reviewing the issue de novo.
Of the twenty-eight cases citing Burket to reject a suspect's claimed invocation of the right to counsel, eleven were state cases possibly subject to future AEDPA review. 206 210. Id. at 1065. 211. Id. The court noted that the record was inconsistent as to whether Clark said "I think I would like to talk to a lawyer," or "I think I'd like to talk to a lawyer." Id. at 1065 n.2. Like the Arizona court, the Ninth Circuit opted for the first phrase, but suggested that there was not any difference between the two for the purposes of its analysis. Id. This is noteworthy because it demonstrates the exacting precision with which courts examine everyday phraseology when they apply the Davis "clear and unequivocal request" rule. That precision lies at the core of the AEDPA ratchet effect because courts closely examining a possible invocation will look to other courts' interpretations, some of them made through AEDPA's deferential prism.
212. Id. at 1065.
Id.
asked the detective, "should I be telling you or should I talk to a lawyer?" 214 Detective Chambers responded by saying that, in his opinion, a judge or jury would consider remorse as more important than fear of punishment, and the interview continued. 215 Soon after that, Clark confessed to the murder. 216 Before trial, he moved to suppress his confession, but the trial court denied his motion, and a jury ultimately convicted Clark of second degree murder and theft. 217 Clark's federal habeas petition, filed under AEDPA, rested primarily on his assertion that the state trial court erred by admitting his confession, which he contended was taken in violation of Edwards v. Arizona. 218 A magistrate judge determined that Clark had made an unambiguous request for counsel and that the Arizona Court of Appeals was unreasonable in holding otherwise. 219 The district court, however, rejected this conclusion and denied Clark's habeas petition. 220 The Ninth Circuit affirmed. 221 In reaching its conclusion, the court spent several sentences discussing Burket v. Angelone, 222 and comparing the statement in that case ("I think I need a lawyer" 223 ), with Clark's ("I think I would like to talk to a lawyer"). 224 The court also discussed at length the presence of the phrase, "I think," in the statement. 225 The Ninth Circuit denied Clark's appeal. 226 It is noteworthy that the Ninth Circuit issued an opinion in this case some five months before amending and superseding it with a second opinion. 227 The amended opinion was published three months after the U.S. Supreme Court's excoriation of the Ninth Circuit's AEDPA approach in Lockyer v. Andrade. 228 In its original opinion, the court stated, "While the issue is a close one, we conclude that Clark's statement that he thought he would like to talk to a lawyer did not constitute an unambiguous and unequivocal request for counsel within the meaning of Davis." 229 The court removed this language from the amended opinion, stating instead that "the Arizona court's determination that Clark's statement did not constitute an unambiguous and unequivocal request for counsel within the meaning of Davis was not contrary to clearly established [f]ederal law, nor was it an objectively unreasonable application of such law." 230 The change in the superseding opinion is significant for two reasons. First, the court originally expressed some reluctance to reject the purported invocation before clarifying that what was "reasonable" was the actual issue in the case. Second, it makes clear that the court recognized the subtle, but important, difference between the two holdings (helped along by Lockyer) and saw the need to state it directly in its revised opinion. The fact that the court's expression of reluctance is absent from the post-Lockyer ruling shows how AEDPA obscures a court's underlying outlook on the constitutional issue at play. This masking of the court's underlying logic makes it difficult for subsequent courts to determine the law as described in AEDPA's pseudo-precedent. Clark would be more useful as accurate guidance on invocation law if AEDPA had not masked the court's reluctance.
Clark has been cited in some 2298 state and federal cases. 231 Of those, 113 cited Clark on the right-to-counsel issue, of which twenty-nine were non-AEDPA cases. In all but four of those twenty-nine cases, Clark's statement, "I think I want to talk to a lawyer," was cited as persuasive precedent to hold on de novo review that a similar phrase was insufficient to invoke the right to counsel. 232 Of the twenty-five cases citing Clark to hold an invocation invalid, eleven were state cases, themselves subject to possible federal AEDPA review. In the four cases in which Clark's phrase was not used to hold invalid a right-to-counsel invocation, it was cited twice in dissent, 233 once as contrary precedent in a holding of validity, 234 and once against an invocation of the right to silence. 235 Only one decision noted that Clark was decided under the AEDPA standard of review.
236
Both Burket and Clark demonstrate the risk that the AEDPA standard of review poses to the integrity of substantive law. 237 State and federal trial courts are prone to treat precedent like Burket and Clark as determinative of what constitutes a valid request for counsel, rather than what is not an "objectively unreasonable" interpretation of Davis. When federal courts appear to reject phrases as clear to the layperson as "I think I would like to talk to a lawyer" or "I think I want a lawyer," they become powerfully persuasive to judges analyzing similar statements or questions in courts of the first instance. [Vol. 86:905 V. THE U.S. SUPREME COURT SHOULD DISCOURAGE COURTS NOT APPLYING AEDPA FROM RELYING ON AEDPA CASES AEDPA presents a substantial risk of weakening substantive constitutional protections, both in the case of the Miranda right to counsel and in other areas of criminal law. Typically, this shift will narrow defendants' rights because AEDPA is only applied in cases in which defendants are convicted, and it requires a high degree of deference to those convictions. 239 As described above, 240 this ratchet effect will perpetuate itself as state courts cite federal AEDPA decisions to reject defendants' constitutional challenges, and those defendants then challenge their convictions in federal habeas petitions governed by AEDPA. The net result will be that the rights that the Court articulated will be whittled away to their bare minimum. In the case of invoking the Miranda right to counsel, this ratchet effect could pare down the phrases acceptable to satisfy the Davis clear and unequivocal request rule to only the most crystal clear. As Justice Souter put it, courts and police will expect "suspects to speak with the discrimination of an Oxford don." 241 For these reasons, courts rendering a decision on anything other than the AEDPA standard of review should refrain from relying on cases decided under AEDPA. Both state and federal courts should exercise this restraint, although federal courts are at a somewhat lower risk of ratcheting down defendants' rights because their decisions will not be subject to subsequent review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This precaution would arrest the AEDPA ratchet effect and confine the scope of the legislation to what Congress originally intended. 242 In other words, the restrictive shift AEDPA created will halt where it stands. In order to put this halt into effect, the U.S. Supreme Court should discourage courts from basing their decisions on AEDPA cases unless the citing court is also applying AEDPA.
243
While it is true that this precaution would limit the range of citable opinions, there would be ample precedent available to trial courts and direct-review appeals courts. First, any non-AEDPA decision (both state and federal) would be available. Additionally, there are at least six years of habeas decisions applying Davis untainted by AEDPA. Davis was decided in 1994, two years before AEDPA's enactment, and AEDPA's standard of review did not control most of the habeas cases decided by federal appeals courts from 1996 to 2000. 244 Almost all of these cases decided Davis issues on a de novo standard of review, and courts continue to apply that standard in non-AEDPA cases. 245 Even if they persist in citing AEDPA cases, courts not applying AEDPA should acknowledge the statute's highly deferential standard of review. They should also account for the standard's effect on the substantive constitutional analysis in the case they are citing. This approach may be wise. reasonable. 246 In other words, a court may need an AEDPA case with similar facts to "correctly identif[y] the governing legal rule," 247 even if it does not look to that case as guidance for application of the rule. Even if it uses the interpretation deemed reasonable by the AEDPA decision, the non-AEDPA court in this scenario should be careful to note the confining and deferential nature of the AEDPA standard of review.
In addition, federal courts deciding habeas petitions under § 2254(d)(1) should clearly state the standard of review applied in their holdings. If a federal court of appeals, deciding a case under AEDPA, states clearly in its holding that it is only determining that the decision on review was not "objectively unreasonable," 248 a non-AEDPA court would likely find the holding less persuasive than if that caveat were absent.
249 By inserting such a warning, federal courts applying AEDPA would help mitigate AEDPA's effect on substantive constitutional law. However, the approach of adding an explicit reference to the standard of review is merely a precautionary supplement to, and cannot replace, the U.S. Supreme Court admonition proposed above.
CONCLUSION
AEDPA's ratchet effect has narrowed the substantive constitutional protections afforded by the Miranda right to counsel by making the Davis "clear and unequivocal request" rule harder to satisfy. However, this effect is not restricted to the Miranda right to counsel. Any number of other substantive areas of criminal law could be affected in the same way. Because a federal court reviewing a state court ruling under AEDPA must ask only if the state ruling is an "objectively unreasonable" application of federal law, any potentially "reasonable" interpretation of substantive law will stand, even if it is "incorrect or erroneous. court's interpretation can then be cited by any lower court, even though it does not represent the federal court's own interpretation of federal law, as would be the case in the pre-AEDPA de novo standard of review. In the case of the Miranda right to counsel, this means that as more and more AEDPA precedent is created, state-court interpretations of federal rights will supplant those of lower federal courts, resulting in the strictest invocation standard Davis will allow. That is, thanks in part to AEDPA, suspects wishing to invoke their right to counsel may ultimately be required to say nothing less clear than, "I want a lawyer."
